HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1

Tuesday 14 November 2006 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

• Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
• This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
  Section A page 2
  Section B page 5
  Section C page 8
SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources refer to purges and terror under Stalin, and their impact on Russian society.


Prokofiev [the composer] became a lonely figure in Paris. “I am a Russian, the least suited of men to be an exile. I’ve got to talk to my own people, so that they can give me something I lack here – their songs – my songs.”

From 1932 Prokofiev began to spend half the year in Moscow, and later he and his family moved there permanently. He was given a luxurious apartment and allowed the freedom to travel to the West (at a time when Soviet citizens were sent to the gulag for speaking to a foreigner). He was awarded prizes and flattered in his native land.

But Prokofiev’s working life became difficult. Attacked as a formalist [one who was regarded as preferring their art as an art form, rather than it being understood by the millions] like Shostakovich, he retreated by writing music for the young: Peter and the Wolf with its wolf hunt, was a product of the terror years, but most of the music he had written in Paris and New York was banned.

SOURCE B Extract from Hope against Hope, by N Mandelstam, London, 1971. The author and her poet husband were exiled in 1934, allowed to return to Moscow in 1937, but he was sent to a labour camp in 1938, and died there.

As regards the Stalinist terror, we could never imagine that it might end. … It was essential to smile – if you didn’t it meant you were afraid or discontented. This nobody could afford to admit. Everybody had to walk around wearing a cheerful expression, as though to say: “what’s going on is no concern of mine, I have important work to do. I am trying to do my best for the state. My conscience is clear – if what’s his name is arrested, there must be good reason.”

The mask [pretence] was only taken off at home, and then not always. Even from your children you had to hide how horror-struck you were; otherwise they might let something slip at school.
SOURCE C


There was nothing new about blaming Soviet rural officials for harvest failures, but in the raion [local district] trials of 1937, officials were not blamed for failing to meet state grain procurement targets, as in the early 1930s, but for allowing so little grain to be distributed among kolkhoz [collective] households, that they starved.

Alekseev, a kolkhoz chairman admitted at his trial:
“In 1936 no grain was distributed at the harvest. When I saw it, I decided to run away. I told the chairman of the raion. He said: “get away as fast as you can.” Alekseev ran, but not fast enough, probably because he tried to take his house with him, using kolkhoz horses.

SOURCE D


He [Stalin] offered his nation a positive and new programme of social organization which, though it caused privation and suffering for many, also created undreamt-of openings for others, who had a vested interest in his rule. … The purges created numberless vacancies in every field. From 1933 to 1938 about half a million administrators, technicians, economists, and men of other professions graduated, and filled the ranks of the purged and emptied offices. They, brought up in the Stalinist cult from childhood, threw themselves into their work with a zeal and enthusiasm undimmed by recent events.
SOURCE E

List drawn up by Stalin and distributed by the Head of the NKVD giving quotas of people to be arrested (no cause was given) in particular regions: 30 July 1937. First category meant death, second 8 to 10 years imprisonment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1st Category</th>
<th>2nd Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1 500</td>
<td>3 750</td>
<td>5 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beloruss</td>
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<td>10 000</td>
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<td>3 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
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<td>1 200</td>
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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2  The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources refer to the period of the Civil War in China from 1946 to 1949 between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (Kuomintang).

SOURCE A  Extract from an article entitled The Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) government is besieged by the whole people, written by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) for Hsinhua (a communist news agency), May 1947.

Since US imperialism and its running dog Jiang (Chiang Kai-shek) have adopted the policies of turning China into a US colony, launching a civil war and strengthening the fascist dictatorship, they have declared themselves to be enemies of the entire Chinese people. This has forced all the people to unite in a life-and-death struggle against the reactionary Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) government. The classes of the Chinese people oppressed by the reactionary policies and united for their own salvation, include the workers, peasants, bourgeoisie, other patriotic elements, the minority nationalities and overseas Chinese. This is a very broad national united front.

The results of extremely reactionary financial and economic policies long pursued by the government are uncontrolled inflation, soaring prices, ever-spreading bankruptcy of the industry and commerce of the bourgeoisie and daily deterioration in the livelihood of the working masses, government employees and teachers. In these circumstances all classes of the people cannot but unite and fight for their very survival.


The cause of Mao’s triumph lies in the fact that, appealing as he did to ancient and deeply rooted feelings, he gave a faith to the peasants of China. Totalitarian doctrines are always based upon simple slogans, easy to exploit. His external theme was the struggle against foreign imperialists who had “enslaved” the higher civilization that was China. As for internal themes, he cleverly appealed to the instincts of social justice and property ownership. In announcing agrarian reform, in dispossessing the landlords and lowering taxes, in giving landless farmhands plots to hold as their very own, Mao played the best of cards – to be cynically thrown aside once victory was won.

But these strong cards, without any doubt, would have been insufficient had Jiang (Chiang) been at the head of a strong political organisation. The Guomindang (Kuomintang) owed its weakness to its inaction and poor grasp of the economic and military necessities of the Civil War.
Guomindang (Kuomintang) leaders who were sworn to end warlordism, had ended up supporting one of the biggest warlords in Chinese history. Sworn to establish democracy, they had created a despotism which made the ancient emperors of China look like amateurs. Promising to improve the “livelihood of the people”, they made it worse than it had been in the memory of living man. Dedicated to freeing China from foreign powers they had become dependent upon them. So these men had no cause. They now believed they could do little more than blindly follow their leader on the road to destruction.

In contrast, communist success was founded not on ideology but by arousing the hope, trust and affection of the people.

It was the Chinese Communist forces who started this war, but the encouragement had come from Moscow. Communists, in their propaganda, succeeded in making people both in and outside China lose sight of the government’s duty and authority, and mistake it for an aggressive-minded fascist regime. At the same time left-wing liberals in the West believed that the Chinese Communists had launched the insurrection for the sake of democracy and agrarian reform.

During their all-out rebellion Communists relied only 20% on their military strength, but as much as 50% on international propaganda and intelligence and 30% on organising a national front and promoting defeatism. Their effective use of propaganda, spying and infiltration accounted for the government’s loss of control over the nation-wide situation. Thus the use of military force was but one of the numerous weapons used by the Chinese Communists in the final battle.
Source E

Photograph of a street scene in Shanghai, taken by Henri Cartier-Bresson in 1948.

The shopping bag or package hanging from the handlebar of the bicycle contains banknotes.
Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its effects on the Cold War.


The Soviet retreat from Cuba, the growing atmosphere of détente and the Sino-Soviet split all combined to weaken Soviet control over Eastern Europe and provide some opportunities for the satellite states to pursue their own policies … The Soviet Government’s efforts to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe … suffered a serious setback when in January 1968 Alexander Dubček became the First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party … He attempted to create a socialist system that would be based on the consent of the people. In April 1968 he revealed his program for democratic change and modernization of the economy, which marked the start of what was called the Prague Spring. In June he abolished censorship, which led to a flood of anti-Soviet propaganda being published in Czechoslovakia. These developments began to worry Brezhnev and the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact.
SOURCE B

Cartoon by Herblock (an American cartoonist), published in September 1968. During the night of August 20-21, Soviet troops, joined by Warsaw pact allies, occupied Czechoslovakia.

“She might have invaded Russia”

The officer with the gun is Leonid Brezhnev General Secretary of the Communist Party. The sign behind him reads “Czechoslovakia” and the woman lying on the ground has the word “freedom” written on her.

“She might have invaded Russia” - a 1968 Herblock Cartoon, copyright by The Herb Block Foundation.

SOURCE C

An extract from a speech by Leonid Brezhnev given on 12 November 1968.

The measures taken by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist states …

The CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) has always asserted that every socialist country must determine its own development on the path of socialism, in accordance with national circumstances. But when there is a threat to the cause of socialism in that country – a threat to the security of the socialist states as a whole – this becomes the concern of all socialist countries …

Clearly, such action as military aid to suppress a threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary, forced measure which can be provoked only by the direct activity of the enemies of socialism … Czechoslovakia’s detachment from the socialist states, would have brought it into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been dangerous (or threatening) to the other socialist states …
SOURCE D  

Moscow’s goals in Czechoslovakia led most observers on both sides of the Iron Curtain to regard the intervention as a decisive Soviet victory. In the arena of East-West confrontation, the negative consequences of the operation were short-lived. Relations with the west experienced some setbacks, particularly with regard to the recently concluded Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were also delayed; President Johnson refused to travel to Leningrad in September 1968 and his successor, President Nixon, hesitated to re-establish contacts in 1969. Ultimately, however, the need to involve Moscow in negotiations with North Vietnam overcame American indignation, and Washington soon proved willing to improve relations in the interest of détente …

The invasion of Czechoslovakia created instant tensions with the East European nations that had not taken part in the operation. As for the nations remaining in the Soviet-led alliance, the invasion confirmed that autonomous political reforms would no longer be tolerated. In the broader international socialist movement, the invasion seriously damaged Moscow’s ability to build a united front against the Chinese …

SOURCE E  
An extract from a speech by Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) [Chinese premier] on 23 August 1968 at Rumania’s National Day Reception.

A few days ago, the Soviet revisionist leading clique [critical term used to describe those who were no longer considered to be traditional Marxists] and its followers dispatched massive armed forces to launch a surprise attack on Czechoslovakia and swiftly occupied it, with the Czechoslovak revisionist leading clique openly calling on the people not to resist, thus committing enormous crimes against the Czechoslovak people. This is the most obvious and most typical example of fascist power politics played by the Soviet Union … It marks the total bankruptcy of Soviet revisionism.

The Chinese Government and people strongly condemn the Soviet revisionist leading clique and its followers for their crime of aggression – the armed occupation of Czechoslovakia – and firmly support the Czechoslovak people in their heroic struggle of resistance to Soviet military occupation …