HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1

Tuesday 5 May 2009 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET – INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

• Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
• This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
  Section A page 2
  Section B page 5
  Section C page 8
SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1  The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany.


Some politicians say that the Soviet Union has now allied with France and Poland and that from an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of that treaty, and that this change can be explained by the establishment of the fascist regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course we are not enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the issue here, if only because fascism in Italy has not prevented the USSR from establishing the best relations with that country.


Stalin had always expected war to break out again in Europe. In every major speech to the Central Committee he stressed the dangers in contemporary international relations. Lenin had taught his fellow communists that economic rivalry would turn imperialist capitalist powers against each other until capitalism was overthrown. World wars were inevitable meanwhile, and Soviet foreign policy had to start from this first premise [assertion] of Leninist theory on international relations.

The second premise was to avoid unnecessary involvement in an inter-imperialist war … But what could Stalin do? Complete diplomatic freedom was not possible. But if he dealt mainly with the victors of the First World War, could he trust them? If he attempted an approach to Hitler, would he not be rebuffed [refused]? … In the winter of 1938–1939 he [Stalin] concentrated efforts to prepare the USSR for war.
European diplomacy was played out like a game of poker with swift moves, secret talks and cold hearts. The dictators proved much better at this fast moving game than the democracies who had started to play in earnest much too late. Belatedly they realised that Hitler had to be stopped: and on 31 March guaranteed the Polish border. They needed Russia to join them but failed to understand Stalin’s point of view, his sense of weakness and isolation. Ironically the Polish guarantee increased Stalin’s doubts about the depth of British commitment: if Hitler invaded Poland, what was to stop Britain from using the guarantee as a bargaining [tool] to negotiate another Munich-style deal, leaving Hitler on his borders?

Stalin therefore required a contractual military alliance with the West if he was not to turn to Hitler. On 29 June, Zhdanov backed the German option, in a Pravda article, stating “I believe that the British and French have no wish for a treaty of equality with the USSR” … Britain and France sent a low-level delegation to Moscow by steamboat to offer an alliance but no guarantee of Soviet frontiers and no freedom of action in the Baltic. Stalin was unimpressed and that same day, 12 August, the Russians signalled to the Germans that they were ready to start negotiations.

**SOURCE C**

**SOURCE D**

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR, wishing to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the USSR, have reached the following agreement.

1. To refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

2. Should one of the contracting parties become the object of belligerent action [war] by a third power, the other will not help the third power.

3. The Governments of the two contracting parties shall in future maintain contact and consultation with each other in order to exchange information on problems of common interest.

…

5. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the two parties they shall settle their disputes through friendly exchange of opinion, or if necessary arbitration.

Secret additional protocol:
The question of whether the interests of both parties are served by the maintenance of an independent Poland and how such a state shall be [limited] can only be decided after further developments.
SOURCE E


PICTURE REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS
Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses … ; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to The Great Leap Forward.

SOURCE A

Excerpt from a talk, “Restore Agricultural Production” by Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, to all the comrades attending the Seventh Plenary Session of the Third Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, July 1962.

URL: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol/text/a1400.html

In 1957 the grain yield amounted to 195 million tons, and 145 million tons last year. I cannot say for sure whether it will reach 150 million tons this year, since the weather has not been favourable. Some places suffered from floods and others from drought. All things considered, the grain yield this year will not be lower than last year’s, but even if it reaches 150 million tons, it will still be 45 million tons short of the 1957 level. We must try to find ways to restore grain production within a certain period of time and, on the basis of increased grain output, restore the production of cash crops.

SOURCE B


The alternative view is that the reason why the Leap failed was not because of a faulty strategy, but because of gross failures in its implementation, the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians and an element of misfortune, with bad weather leading to three poor harvests. Thomas Rawski argued that the Great Leap Forward years saw experimentation which was later to prove highly fruitful, and he cited the attempts to build rural industries with close ties to agriculture, training and consulting programmes linking enterprises at different technical levels, and the effort to familiarize the Chinese population with the products and techniques of industry. Victor Lippitt suggested that China had no choice but to seek a development model suited to her needs, not one imported from the Soviet Union. The Great Leap Forward, he claimed, “represents a development strategy upon which rational people might have chosen to embark”. It should be represented not as the loss of a decade of development, but as “the one chance to realize a decade of development among the policy alternatives from which China could choose”.

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Turn over
Mao’s faith that the ideologically motivated peasants and workers could overcome all obstacles, that the
grassroot masses were what mattered, not the professionals and intellectuals, found practical expression in
They proved an unmitigated [total] disaster for the Chinese economy and people.

In the countryside the people’s co-operatives were merged into huge communes under ideological local
party leadership. They now comprised not only agriculture but also grassroot industrial units. Unrealistic
production targets were set. Now not only would steel be smelted in the efficient new modern mills,
but iron would be produced in small peasant furnaces. Chaos ensued: industrial production declined and
agricultural output dropped by a quarter. A renewed “leap” in 1959 and 1960 resulted in further disastrous
agricultural and industrial losses. In the first quarter of 1961 alone output of twenty-five key industrial
products dropped by between 30 and 40 per cent. There was a chronic grain shortage as China’s population
increased, and famine became widespread. An estimated 19 million people died.
Agriculture was also neglected because of the priority given to steel. Many of the peasants were exhausted from having to spend long hours finding fuel, scrap iron, iron ore and keeping the furnaces going. The fields were often left to the women and children, who had to do everything by hand, as the animals were busy making the contribution to steel production. When harvest time came in autumn 1958, few people were in the fields.

The failure to get in the harvest in 1958 flashed a warning that a food shortage was on its way, even though official statistics showed a double-digit increase in agricultural output. It was officially announced that in 1958 China’s wheat output had overtaken that of the United States. The Party newspaper, the People’s Daily, started a discussion on the topic “How do we cope with the problem of producing too much food?”.

SOURCE E

Extract from _Wild Swans, Three Daughters of China_ by Jung Chang, London, 1991. Jung Chang was the youngest of the three daughters.
Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses … ; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3  The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to the end of détente.


In the wake of the 1972 Moscow summit, the spirit of détente seemed to flourish … However, by the time Nixon and Brezhnev met again, in June of 1974 in Moscow, the glow of détente had faded. A dangerous confrontation during the Middle East fall [autumn] of 1973 had exposed the limits of superpower cooperation. The SALT II discussions had drifted into deadlock … and the Watergate scandal, having ruined Nixon’s presidency, would soon force him to resign. … When Nixon resigned in 1974, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was at first alarmed, but soon was reassured when Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, proved equally practical. The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 changed the rules of the game and left the Soviets uncertain of how to proceed.


When I became president I announced that human rights would be a foundation of our entire foreign policy. I didn’t single out the Soviet Union for my human rights policy … But the Soviet leaders did assume that my human rights policy was targeted against them, to embarrass them … There’s no doubt that this was a cause of disagreement between me and Brezhnev … It was a blow to the United States when the shah of Iran was deposed … We never dreamed that the shah was likely to be overthrown by his own people … I was taken aback by surprise when the militants overran our embassy and captured our hostages and then refused to release them … I had no warning in Christmas week of 1979 that the Soviets were going to invade Afghanistan … And I could see that the Soviet movement into Afghanistan was not an end in itself. The intelligence that I had from various sources, including within the Soviet Union, was that the Soviets’ long-term goal was to have access to warm-water oceans from Afghanistan, either through Iran or through Pakistan. I saw this as a direct threat to global stability and to the security of my own nation …
… We are experiencing a very complicated period in the development of international relations. A serious deterioration of the situation has occurred. And the primary source of this deterioration is the growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government, the continually more sharply anti-Soviet character of the statements of the President. Judging from appearances, he is intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the USA under the banner of anti-Soviet policy and a return to the “Cold War”. This approach of the government of the USA is putting its mark on the policy of the Western powers both in the NATO bloc, and in Africa, and in relation to China … In the policy of the USA changes are taking place which are dangerous for the affairs of peace. Behind the lies and slander on the USSR … concrete matters are being perpetrated, directed against peace and détente. The course of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitations of strategic arms is intentionally being delayed. Attempts at clumsy interference in our internal affairs are being perpetrated, in fact, the ties between both countries are being curtailed…The government of the USA has become the inspiration for a new colonialism in Africa – the policy of armed intervention and open interference in the affairs of African governments, the merciless suppression of revolutionary liberation processes …

SOURCE D

*Cartoon by Geoff Hook, an Australian cartoonist, 13 February 1980.*


The person on the cartoon is Leonid Brezhnev leader of the Soviet Union. The rings are the symbol of the Olympic Games which were to take place in 1980 and the United States intended to boycott.
The revitalization of Cold War tensions from 1979 ended a period of détente and heralded a return to language and actions reminiscent of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the USA there was a feeling of déjà-vu as a Democratic president was criticized by a renewed Committee on Present Danger for softness on communism, among other things … Soviet pressure on Poland involved threats of invasion. Western economic problems and debates about greater military spending escalated into a NATO crisis. There were confrontations in Asia, Central America and Africa. By the time Soviet forces toppled the Afghan president and moved to bolster [support] their handpicked successor in December 1979, détente was over.