History route 2  
Higher level and standard level  
Paper 1 – the Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–1979

Friday 6 May 2016 (afternoon)

1 hour

Instructions to candidates

• Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
• Answer all the questions.
• The maximum mark for this examination paper is [25 marks].
Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses … ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the establishment of Israel; Arab response and 1948/1949 war.

**Source A**

Adeed Dawisha, a professor of political science specializing in Middle Eastern history, writing in the academic book *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (2003).

The pretended show of Arab unity hid deep divisions that had little to do with any commitment to their Arab brethren in Palestine and everything to do with personal ambitions and rivalries. King Abdullah of Transjordan wanted to include Palestine into his kingdom, and preferably to create a Greater Syria. The Syrians, eyeing Abdullah’s enormous appetite feared Jordan more than Israel …

The questionable commitment of the Arab leaders to the cause is clearly shown by the inadequate number of soldiers in the Arab armies and the tactics used in the war. At no time did the combined strength of the Arab armies exceed that of the Jewish troops …

The Israelis benefited from such inter-Arab suspicions. The result was a political disaster and a military catastrophe … Arab armies and governments competed for their own slice of Palestine … Their “united” effort lacked any coordination on the field; so much in fact that they went out of their way not to come to the aid of each other, and indeed, in some cases, sabotaged one another.

**Source B**

Leslie Illingworth, a political cartoonist, depicts the situation immediately before the proclamation of the State of Israel. From the British newspaper the *Daily Mail* (12 August 1948).

Key:

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<th>Jews</th>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Arab Legion</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>Egyptians</td>
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<td>L.Tiberia</td>
<td>Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee)</td>
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[Source: Cartoon by Leslie Gilbert Illingworth: ILW1480
Originally published in: Daily Mail 12/08/1948]
Source C
Hasan Afif El-Hasan, a Palestinian political scientist and journalist, examines the political and military history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the academic book Israel or Palestine? Is the Two State Solution Already Dead? (2010).

The Palestinians overestimated the power of the Arab military and underestimated Jewish military power and determination. The 500,000 Jews in Palestine were able to provide more fighting men and women than all the invading Arab armies combined. Their military planning and their determination to fight for their lives, and for the cause that they believed in, provided them with additional strength and superiority. Many of their fighters had military experience, having fought the Arab rebels in 1936–1939 and, later on, the Nazis in the Second World War. The highly-motivated veterans of the Haganah, supported by the armed members of the Irgun, Stern, and Lehi paramilitary organizations, were more effective than the inexperienced Arab armies.

Source D

The invasion by the Arab armies did not necessarily mean that the Jews now faced superior Arab forces. The invading Arab armies were ill-prepared for battle, and poorly equipped; they suffered from a total lack of co-ordination and very low motivation. Moreover, fiery speeches apart, the Arab leaders did not send sufficient forces to Palestine as they needed the bulk of their armies to protect their regimes back home from popular revolution or military takeover. At practically every stage of the war, except during the first weeks of the Arab invasion until the first truce, Israel was able to put together forces far superior to those of its enemies … [Israel benefited from its] strong organisational capacity …. and a belief that defeat was not an option.

Source E
Moshe Sharett, the Israeli foreign minister, in the official record of his speech to the UN General Assembly (11 May 1949). The speech immediately followed the vote to admit Israel to the UN.

At no stage in the tribulations of the Jewish people had its [their] basic insecurity been more tragically laid bare than in the Second World War, when three out of every four Jews in Europe, one out of every three Jews in the world, had been put to death.

In their ancestral home, the Jews had laboured long and hard to establish an independent Jewish state … The denial of independence to the Jewish people would have been a flagrant anomaly [obvious irregularity] and a grievous wrong. When the hour had come, the Jews had known that their own survival and freedom in their own country, as well as the fulfilment of the hopes of countless generations, were at stake. In that conviction had lain their ability, outnumbered and with inferior arms, to defend themselves and to uphold their independence.
1. (a) What, according to Source A, were the reasons for the Arab defeat in the war of 1948 to 1949? [3]

(b) What is the message conveyed by Source B? [2]

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and D about the reasons for Israel’s success in the war. [6]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source C and Source E for historians studying the war of 1948 to 1949. [6]

4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, examine the reasons why Israel was able to defeat its Arab opponents in the war of 1948 to 1949. [8]